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sense, without which genius is a misfortune; an instinctive accuracy of judgment, which always proportioned his efforts to the
occasion. He was never guilty of the ridiculous and common
error amongst young members, of attempting to force the subject
beyond its nature-of swelling trifles with consequence, and
working the ocean into tempest, "1To waft a feather, or to drown
a fly." "He was always earnest and dignified-never captious.
Mr. Wirt, we believe, possessed in a large degree the stern
virtues, the moral worth, and the eariest, firm, and profound
mind of Marshall.
In the several judicial and state offices to which Mr, Wirt
was called, he -fulfilled his duties with faithfulness and credit.
He died in Washington, February 18th 1834.
It were well if the young and rising members of the American
bar would study more earnestly and thoroughly the character and
genius of such men; and we can but indulge the hope that the
country, and the profession may be abundantly favored in all coming time with lawyers of the stamp of WTTLT&1 WIST.

J.F. .

FE'CENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme owrt of the United State.
JOHN G. HANSBROUGH ET AL. v. PHILIP F. W. PECK.
Where a vendor of real estate oa default in the terms of payment by vendee,
goes into a court of equity and has the contract declared void and of no effect, and
is remitted to his original title and possessio'n, this is not a proceeding in rescission,
but in affirmance of the contract, and -does not entitle the vendee to recover back
the part of the purchase-money already.paid.
A purchaser of real estate, who has paidnpart -f his purchase-money or done
an act in part perfoxnsnce of his agreement and then refuses to complete his
contract, the vendor being williug to do his part, will'n6t be-permitted. to recove,
back what has been thus adfanced or done.
Where a parol promise is Fnbitantially the same as-a previous written dne, and
nothing is done under the latter which the proinissor was not already bound to do
under the former, no new consideration passing between the pirties, the existence
or enforcement of'the parol contract cannot be set up as a rescission of the former
written one.
A purchaser.after payment of part of the purchase-money, intended to abandon
the contract, and the vendor promised, if he would pay up arrears, to indulge him
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ror & certain time. The purchaser paid up the arrears, but the vendor enforced
his contract within the time (as alleged) that he promised to forbear. Held, that
there was no consideration for the promise, the purchaser having done nothing he
was not already boand to do by his original contract.

THIS was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
The bill was filed in the court below by the plaintiffs to recover
back moneys paid upon a contract, dated 28th January 1857, for
the purchase by them of several lots of land in the city of
Chicago; and, also, for the value of improvements made on the
same, on the ground that the contract had been rescinded by the
defendant.
The purchase-money amounted to $93,000, to be paid on the
29th April 1861, some four years and three months from date,
together with semi-annual interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per
annum. After erecting irhprovements on -the premises of the
value of e18,000, and paying the interest for two years, the
plaintiffs becoming embarrassed, or dissatisfied with their contract,
were desirous of surrendering it, but were persuaded by the
defendant to remain, and paid the interest for another year, 1859.
After that no further payments were made, and, on the 1st April
1861, the defendant filed a bill in chancery in the state court to
prevent the removal of the buildings from the premises, and to
get possession of the sap,, and, on the 23d August 1862, a decree'
was entered to this effect, and the defendant put *into the
possession.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NELSON, J.-It will be seen from the statement of facts, that
the plaintiffs were in default on account of the non-payment of the
interest for more than a year, and also that the principal fell due
a few days after the filing of the bill on account of this default in
the payments. The contract was a very stringent one. Time was,
in terms, made of the essence of it, in respect to the payinents;
and, further, in case of a default in any one payment, for thirty
days, the agreement was to be null and void, and no longer'bind.
ing, at the option of the vendor, and all payments that had been
made were to be forfeited to him; and also in case of default in
any of the payments it was hgreed that the contract, at the elee
tion of the vendor, was to be at an end, and the purchasers deemed
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to be in possession as tenants at will, liable for a rent equal to the
amount of interest of the purchase-money.
The dbcree founded on this contract in the suit in chancery,
and which is made a part of the bill in the case before us, and
which suit was litigated between these parties, restrained the
defendants, the purchasers, from removing the buildings from the
premises, and declared them to be fixtures ; and for -the default
in the payment of the purchase-money the plaintiff, the vendor,
was put in possession, and all the tenants were required to attorm
to him; and, further, it declared that he was entitled to the estate
and interest in the lots,.the same as before the contract, and t6
remove ahy doubt in the title by reason of -the contract and the
default in the payments, it declared that the premises shall be
discharged from any encumbrance or charge in respect to the
contract of sale; and that the purchasers, or any one claiming
through them, be for ever debarred from having any estate, or
interest', or right of possession in the premises, having lost the
same by wilful default ;, and the articles of agreement are to be
held in relation to the title and possession as of~no effect and
void, as it respects. the vendor'and all claiming under or through
him.
Now, this is the decree tliat is relied on as having rescinded
the contract at the instance of the defendant, by reason of which
th e plaintiffs have become entitled to recover back the purchase.
money paid, together with the value of the improvements. .The
position is, that there is no longer a subsisting contract, as an
end has- been put to-it by the vendor, and he has in consequence
resumed the *possession, and claims to hold the estate the same as.
if no contract had'bver existed, ad that in such. case 'the purchaser, upon settled principles of law and equity, is at liberty to
recover back the consideration paid and the value of the improvements. But the difficulty is, that the vendor has only availed
himself of a provision of.the contract, which entitled him to proceed in a court of chancery, by reason of the default of the pur-"
chaser in making his pa~yments, to put an end to it and be restored,
to the possession, It is a proceeding.in affirmance, nokin rescission of it, by enforcing a remedy expressly reserved -in it. Indeed,
without such clause or reservation, the remedy would have been
equally available to him. It is a right growing outof-the default
of the purchaser, as the law will not permit him both to withhold
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the purcenase-mnnpy and keep possessibn and enjoy the rents and
profits of the estate ; nor will it subject the vendor to the return
of the purchase-money if he is obliged to go into a court of equity
to be restored to the possession.
In case of a default in the payments, there are several remedies
open to the vendor. He may sue on the contract and recover
judgment for the purchase-money, and take out execution against
the property of the'defendant, and among other property, the
lands sold; or he may bring ejectment, and recover back the possession, but in that case, the purchaser, by going into a court of
equity within a reasonable time and offering payment of the purchase-money, together with costs, is entitled to a performance of
the contract; or the vendor may go in the first instance into a
court of equity, as in the present case, and call on the purchaser
to come forward and paf the money due, or be for ever thereafter
foreclosed from setting up any claim against the estate. In these
contracts for the sale of real estate the Vendor holds the legal
title as a security for the payment of the purchase-money, and in
case of. a persistent default, his better remedy, and under some
circumstances his only safe remedy, is to institute proceedings in
the proper court to foreclose the equity of the purchasdr where
partial payments or valuable improvements have been made. The
court will usually give the purchaser a day, if he desires it,
longer or shbrter, depending on the particular circumstances
of the case, to raise the money and to perform his. part of the
agreement.
This mode of selling real estate in the United States is a very
common and favorite one, and the principles governing the con.
tract, both in law and equity, are more fully and perfectly settled
than in England or any other country. The books of reports are
full of cases arising out of it, and every phas6 .of the litigation
repeatedly considered and adjudged. And no rule in respect to
the contract is better settled than this: That the party who has
advanced money or done an act in part performance of the agreement, and then stops short and refuses to proceed to its ultimate
conclusion, the other party being ready and willing to proceed
and fulfil all his stipulations according to the contract, will not be
permitted to recover back what has thus been advanced or done :
Green v. Green, 9 Cowen 46 ; 13 J. R. 864, SPENCER, J. ; 6
Qray 412; 42 Barbour 58.
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The same doctrine has been repeatedly applied by the courts
of Illinois, the state in which this case arose: 21 Ill. R. 286, and
other cases referred to in the argument.'
This principle would of itself have defeated the plaintiffs in
this suit, independently of the decree foreclosing their equity in
the contract.
It appears in the case that the parties agreed upon the rate of
10 per 6ent. interest for the forbearance of the purchase-money
unpaid, when at the time, as isadmitted, the legal rate was only
6 per cent. But this law did not invalidate the contract. It
Authorized the party to recover ef the party taking usury threlefold the amount above the legal rate, at any time within two years
after'the right, of action accrued. This bill was filed the 23d
-August 1862. The last payment of interest was made 31st
January 1860. More than two years,' therefore, had elapsed
before the suit was brought.
We .should add, it is not admitted by the defendant that this
arrangement had the effect to make the contract usurious ; And
would not,.according to the case. of Butm v. Bigood, 7 B.' & Cr.

458, if the 9xcess of interest :stipulated for was ihfact a part d
t)ie purchase-money.
After the default of the purchasers, and when they were 'disposed-to surrender the contract, the vendor proposed to themif
they would abandon ihe idea,, and pay up the taxes in arrears. and
interest that had accrued, he would indulge them, and to that end,
and until a revival of busiiiess in. Chicago, he would be satisfied
with the net income from the. property over and above .thd taxes
and insurance, and it is averred that they agreed to the p'roposi.
tions and paid the .taxes ahd interest, but that the vendor declined
to carry out the agreement and "enforced the contract, though
there had not been any considerable increase of .income from the
property or revival of trade and business in C.hicago. This pro,visional arrangement is very loosely stated inthe bill, but is, of
course, admitted by the demurrer. It admits the revival of bus i.
ness to some extent before the enforcement of the'contract. There
is great difficulty, however, in determining the extent of increase
contemplated by the arrangement from the statement-ii .the bill.
It was entered into- in November. 1859, and this suit was not
instituted till August 1862, some two years and nine months
afterwards.
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But the true answer to this part of the case is, that the arrangement was not in writing, nor any consideration passing between
the parties that could give validity to it. The promise by the
purchasers was but in affirmation of what they were bound to perform by their written agreement, and all that was done was but in
fulfilment of it.
We have thus gone carefully over the case as presented, and
considered every ground set up on the part of the plaintiffs for
the relief prayed for; but, with every disposition to temper the
-sternness of the law as applicable to . them, we are compelled to
say that, according to the settled principles both of law and equity,
a case for relief has not been established.
The truth of the case is, that these plaintiffs improvidently
entered into a purchase beyond their means, and, doubtless, relied
very much upon the rise in the value of the estate and of the
income, to meet the payments and expenditures laid out upon it.
Their anticipations failed them, and a heay debt was the consequence, beyond their ability to meet. .Of the $93,000 purchasemoney, they have paid only $10,000. Of interest, some $28,000.
They expended for improvements $18,000. There still remained
due against them $88,000 purchase-money and over $20,000
interest, at .the time the vendor wentinto possession. The plaintiffs themselves had been in the possession and enjoyment of. the
premises for a. period exceeding that for which the interest on the
purclhase money had been paid, which, at least, must be regarded'
as an equivalent for the money thus paid.
Decree of the court below affirmed.
In KetcAum Y. Evertson, 13 Johns.
359, after stating, in language adopted
by the court in the principal case, the
general principle, that a vendee having
paid part of the purchase-money and
then refusing to complete his bargain.
shall not be allowed to recover back
what he has paid, SPENcEn, J., continues : "It would be an alarming doctrine to hold that the plaintiffs might
violate the contract, and because they
chose to do so make their own infraction
of the agreement the basis of an action
for money had and received. Every
man who makes a bad bargain, and has

advanced mpney upon it, would have
the same right to recover it back that
the plaintiffs have."
This rule appears to have been uniformly administered in New York :
Dowdle v. Camp, 12 Johns. 451; Ellis
v. Hoskins, 14 Id. 363; Green v. Gree",
9 Cowen 46; Haynes v; Hart, 2 Barb.
58. In Utter v. Stuart, 30 Barb. 20
however, where a vendor, under a right
reserved in the contract, declared it void,
and took possession of the land, it was
held that the vendee might recover the
money paid, although the circumstances
were such that, had the vendor chosen,
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he could have enforced a forfeiture for
failure of vendee to comply with the
contract. The court does not deny the
principle above stated; but, on the contrary, expressly affirms it, and the decision is placed on the ground that the
vendor had several remedies, and that,
having elected one of them, he must be
held strictly to the rules governing that
one. "Had the defendant (the vendor)
seen fit to exercise the right of forfeiture, or had he placed his defence on that
grpund, and relied upon the sale and
conveyance as evidence of that fact, it
is certain that the plaintiff could not
have 'maintained, this action. But the
defendant, both in his answer and in his

proof, places himself upon the right
reserved in the, contract; and that was
a right to declare the contract void in a
certain "contingency, which contingency
having happened, the defendant availed
himself of it."
The general rule governing the rescission of contradts, that the party rescinding must put the other in statu quo, was
held therefore to apply. It is difficult,
however, to reconcile this case -with
Haynes v. Hart, 42 Barb. 58, or indeed
with the previous cases cited. In the
latter case, it is said by JoHmsox, J.,
that "1the party fails to get the property
bargained for, because he neglected and
refused to pa the purchase-price, and
the owner takes it as he would have had
the right to do without any such provision in the agreement.
But the
plaintiff expressly agreed he might take
it in case of a default, and there the
contract ends. T,'ere is no promise for
paying back, aindthere can 'be no recovery without, in such a case."k
It may, therefore, be doubted whether
the law was correctly applied in the
case of Utter v. Stuart.

In Rounds v. Baxter 4 Greenl. 454,
it was held by the Supreme Court of
Baine that where the vendor resumed
possession of the land, the vendeebeing in
default, could not recover the payments
already made. And in Morton v. Chandler, 6 Greenl. 142, A. being indebted to
B., gave him a recognisance on whiciz
execution was. issued, and A.'s land
taken by extent to satisfy. A., in order
to redeem the land, paid part of the
debt, but failed to pay the whole, so
that his right to redeem was lost. He
afterwards brought an action in assump.
sit to recover the money thus fruitlessly
paid, and his counsel endeavored to distinguish the case from Rouhds v. Baxter,.
on the ground that the rights of the.par-'
ties here were determined by statute,
and not by their own contrat; but the
court held that it was a voluntary payment, and could not be recovered. So
also Smith v. Haynes, 9 Greenl. 128.
Similar decisionshave also been made
in other states: Seymoiur v. Bennett, 14
Mass. 26.6; Cartwright v. Gardiir, 5
Cush.'273; Leonard v. Morgan, 6 Gray
412; Page v. Cole, 6 Clarke 153; Walters v. Miller, 10 Iowa 427 ; Donaldson
v. Waters, 30 Ala. 175.
In Ihdiana, however, a different rule
would seem to prevail. In Gilbreth v.
Grewell, 13 id. 484, a contract of sale
of land provided that if default Were
made by the purchaser in fulfilling any
part of the contract, the seller might
regard the contract as forfeited, and resell the land.
The coart held that if the seller enforced the forfeiture he must account to
the purchaser for payments made, with
a right, however, to deduct damages
accruing to him from the purchaser's
breah of the agreement.
J. T. U.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
WILLIAM BARNES v. MARY HATHORN.
A tomb erected upon one's own land, is not necessarily a nuisance to his neighbor; but it may become such from locality and other extraneous facts.
Plaintiff proved that defendant's tomb, erected within forty-four feet of the
former's dwelling-house, contained, in 1856, nine dead bodies, from which was
emitted such an effluvium is to render his house unwholesome; that, after an examination by physicians, the bodies were removed; that the tomb remained unoccupied thereafterwards, until 1865, when another. body was therein interred; that
the plaintiff's life was made uncomfortable while occupying his dwelling-house,
by the apprehension of dangei arising from the use of said tomb; and, that the
erbtlon and occupatioh of said tomb had materially lessened the market value
of his premises. In an action for damages on the foregoing facts: Held, a non-

suit was improperly-o rdered.
ON EXCEPTIONS from Nisi Prius.
Tallman d. Larrabee, for the defendant. Gilbert, for .the plaintiff.
KENT, J.-The facts, which the plaintiff proved or offered to
prove, on which the presiding* judge ordered a nonsuit, are substantially as follows :-That the husband of the defendant, Mary
Hathorn, in 1846, built a tomb on the premises now owned by
her, and within forty-four feet from the west side of the plaintiff's
housd, and the windows of his parlor, sitting-room, and dining-'
room, all of which rooms were on that, side of his hoise ; that
dead bodies were from time to time deposited .in said tomb, until
about the year 1856, when nine such bodies were in the tomb;
that such an effluvium was emitted from them that the plaintiff's
house became unwholesome, and, after an examination of the premises by physicians, the. defendant caused 'them to be removed
from the tomb; that the tomb remained unoccupied for six years,
and until October 1865, when the defendant caused the tomb to
be opened and another dead body to be deposited for burial:therein; that there was a wooden-frame building over the tomb,:which
was whitewashed'; that the tomb was of brick, with ventilators at
each end; that the plaintiff had resided for twenty-five years,
and still'resides, in a house owned by himself and on his lot of
about three acres ; that the defendant's land adjoins his, and the
dividing line is fourteen feet from his dwelling-house, and her loa
VOL. XVI.--6
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contains about 130 acres; that the erection and occupation of the
tomb, as alleged in the writ, diminished the market value of the
plaintiff's house and lot from $1000 to $1500 ; and that his life
in the occupancy of his premises is made uncomfortable by the
apprehension of danger arising from the use of said tomb as a
burial-place.
The plaintiff introduced two physicians, who testified that the
effect of burying dead bodies in the tomb might be unwholesome
and injurious to the occupants of the houie; if theie were much
miasma, long continued and concentrated, it might be fatal; and
that any emission from such bodies might be injurious to the physical and mental system; and, without any effluvia, it might
injuriously affect the inmates of the house by exciting the
imagination.
The action is for injury to the plaintiff by reason of a nuisaice
continued by the defendant.
The- question before us is whether, upon. the case as above
stated,-a nonsuit was properly ordered.
'What is a nuisance ? In considering this question, when the
complaint is based upon the usb by another of hif own property,
we are first met by the general doctrine of the right of every
man -to regulate, improve, and control his own property; to make
such erections as his- own judgment, taste, or interest may sug.
gest;. to be master of his own, without dictation or interference
by his neighbors. On the other hand, we meet that equally wellestablished and. excee dingly comprehensive rule of tha common
law, "sic utere tuo, ut alienum non leda8," which is .the legal
application -of the gospel rule of doing unto others as we would
that they.should do-unto us.
The difficulty is in drawing 'theline in particular cases, so as
to recognise and enforce. both rules, within reasonable limitations.
It is quite clear that the law does not recognise a legal right in
any.one to compel his neighbor to follow his tastes, wishes, or
preferences, or to consult h*is mere convenience. He cannot dic.
tate the style of architecture, or, generally, the location of the
buildings ; or maintain that an unsightly or. ill-proportioned. edifice,
is a nuisance, because -it offends his eye or his cultivated taste.
Nor can he interfere. because he has idle and unfounded fears- of
ill effects from the use of the adjoining lot. .There may be-many
acts which.to the eyes of others appear. to- be unneighborly and
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even unkind, and entirely unnecessary to the full enjoyment of
the property-vexatious and irritating, and the source of constant
mental annoyance, and yet they may be but the legal exercise of
the right of dominion, and therefore cannot be deemed nuisances.
The diminution of the market value, of adjacent buildings, by
such use, will not of itself make it a nuisance. But there is a
limit to such right. No man is at liberty to use his own without
any reference to the health, comfort, of reasonable enjoyment of
like public or private rights by others. Every man gives up
something of this absolute right of dominion and use of his own,
to be regulated or restrained by law, so that others may not'be
hurt or hindered unreasonably in the use and enjoyment of their
property. This is the fundamental principle of all regulated civil
communities, and without it society could hardly exist, except by
the law of the strongest. This illegal, unreasonable, and unjustifiable use to the injury of another, or of the public, the law
denominates a nuisance. 'Such use may be a public nuisance,
and it is so when it affects the community generally. When it
affects -an individual it is called a private nuisance. If, however,
an. individual sustains special damage to himself, beyond that
common to the public, by reason of a public nuisance, -he may
maintain an action for such special injury.
"Nuisance signifies anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience,
or damage :" 3 Black. Com. 215. "Private nuisances may be
defined anything done. to the hurt or annoyance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another:" Id.
"Nuisances to a dwelling-house, are all. acts done by another
from without, which render the enjoyment of life within the house
uncomfortable, whether it be by infecting the air with noisome
smells, or with gases injurious to health, or by exciting the constant apprehension of dangers":" Greenl. on Ev. vol. 2, 467.
The general rule of law has been applied to many cases varying in their character and circumstances. We are at Iiresent
chiefly interested in those relating to dwelling-houses, the habitations of men, although it is useful to examine the whole range of
authorities, to extract, if possible, the true principles applicable
to the subject.
There is one class of cases, arising from the exercise of trades
or business, which are in their nature offensive; or which render
the occupation- of buildings near them unhealthy, or decidedly
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uncomfortable. Many of these cases may be found collected in
a very recent case in this state: Norcross v. Thoms, 51 Maine
503, and more fully in the case of Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray
97. It is unnecessary for us to repeat them here. From the
general tenor of the reported cases, we find that certain doctrines
are.recognised and acted upon. One is, that some trades, occupations, or acts are regarded as in themselves and inherently
noxious, or offensive and prejudicial, without extraneous proof.
In other cases they are not necessarily nuisances, but may become so from locition or some extraneous fact. Another wellestablished doctrine is, that it is not necessary to prove that the
air is poisoned or rendered positively unhealthy; it is en-ough if
the niatter alleged to be a nuisance is offensive to the senses, or
in any way renders the enjoyment of life and property uncom-"
fortable: S tate v. Haines, 30 Maine 65; Bexv. White, 1 Burr.
337; Fish v. Dodge" 4 Denio 811 ; State Y. Pierse, 4 McCord
472; Oatlin v. Valentine, 9 Paige 575; 1lez v. Neil, 2 Oar. "
P1ayne -485.
Exciting constant, and reasonable- apprehensiou of danger,
although no- actual injury has been occasioned, has been held to
be a nuisance. Thus, the keeping of large quantities of gunpowder near. inhabited dwellings, or suffering an adjoining tenement to become ruinous and in danger of falling: Greenl. on
Ev., vol. 2, 467, and cases before cited.
The definitions and rules applicable to. cases as they arise, must
be general, and each case must b6 brought to the test of the principles laid down. -Usually, therefore, it becortes a imixed ques-.
tion of laWand fact, whether, on"the case proved, the existence;
of a nuisance is dstablished or not. If, however, it is clear upon
the facts, that a jury would not be authorized to find that a nuisance did exist, the judge would be' justified in ordering a nonsuit.
The case finds that the erection and continuance of a private-,
tomb is the nuisance complained of. A man may have a legal:.
right to'build such a tomb on his own land, as a general proposi-.
tion. It is not in itslf and inherently a nuisance to his Tieigh.
bors.. If a nuisance 'at all,'it becomes so from its locality or
other extraneous facts. However unwise or inexpedient* it may
be, in the judgment f "reflecting men, to deposit the remains of
deceased relations or friends in private burying-places on private
lands, considering the constant change in the title of real estate

.
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in our country, and the almost certainty that in one or two generations no one will be left to care for or protect the graves, yet.
we know of no law which prohibits stich erections or interments.
But such tombs may be or may become nuisances. On the facts
stated, this particular tomb was, at one time, beyond dispute, a
very serious nuisance, when it "was occupied by nine dead bodies
which emitted such an effluvium as to render the-plaintiff's house
unwholesome ;" and when, after an examination of the premises
by several physicians, all the bodies were removed, it could hardly
be questioned that it was then a nuisance. But the defendant
says that, after these bodies were removed, it ceased to be of such
a character. Whilst the tomb remained for six years unoccupied,
the only ground oil which it could be then called a: nuisance, probably, was its unplea.sant proximity to the house of the plaintiff.
It was only some fifteen paces from the windows of his dining and
sitting-room." It was certainly not a very cheering or exhilarating prospect which met the plaintiff's vision whenever he looked
abroad. How"far, to a man of ordinarily nervous temperament,
or to one of a sensitive nature, who slirunk from the constant
view of this fixed memorial" of death and decay, this -erection
might prove injurious to health, it is impossible to say.
But, that it must have affected his comforit and happiness in
the occupation of his dwelling may be less questionable. There
seem' to have been no necessity for this close proximity, as the"
defendant's farm consisted of at least 180 acres." On what ground
this spot, almost under, the droppings from the plaintiff's house,
was chosen, instead of some retired place; on this large farm,
does not appear, and is not, perhaps, material in our examination
of the case.
But, it seems, that after six years from the time of removal, the
defendant again opens the tomb, and commence's the deposit of
deceased friends anew. One such body had been thus placed in
the tomb before this action was brought. This act would seem to
indicate an intention to again use it for the place of interment of
her family. Now, considering the result stated as having been
produced by the former occupation, might not a man of ordinary
firmness and judgment be reasonably apprehensive of danger ?
In addition to this, we have the testimony of the physicians
called on the trial, that any emission from dead bodies in thav
tomb might be injurious to health, bodily and mentally. It had
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proved so before, and might again. A single body might not be
so liable to create deadly or noxious effluvia as a larger number.
But it would be of the same general character, and might of
itself, prove uncomfortable, if not positively unhealthy. The
defendant made no disavowal of an intention to place other bodies
there.
On the whole, we are of opinion, that the case should have been
submitted to the jury on the evidence, with proper instructions,
and that the nonsuit was not properly ordered.
-Exceptions sustained.
Ionsuit set aside, and new trial granted.
CUTTING, WILTON, BARROWS, DANFORTH; and TAPPEY, J.,

concurred.
The general result of all the cases on
this subject seems to be that, in an action
for nuisance to property, it is sufficient
-to show that the premaises affected cannot be enjoyed as ITully and amply as
before, or are rendered unfit for habita;
ioA by increased danger (Ryan v. Copes,
11 Rich. Law 217), or that their value
is substantially impaired by. the nuisance (but see White v. Cohen, 1 Drew
312) ; f6r whatever is injurious to the
health .(Story v. Hammond, 4 Ham.
376 ; Douglassv. State, 4 Wis. 387) or
indecent (Reg. v. Gray, 4 Fost. & Fin.
73), or offensive to the senses (State v.
Wetherall, 5 Harring. 477), or an obstruction to the use of premises, so as
essentially to interfere with the enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance.
Thus, a regatta, causing many people
to assemble, whereby an adjoining park
was injured and rights of fishing interrupted, was held a nuisance: Bostock v.
Railway, 5 De G. & S: 584. So, the
stopping of a rivulet running to the
land of tniother, and so diminishing the
water used by him for his cattle (Raike4
v. Townsend, 2 Smith 9) ; the keeping
of gunpowder improvidently or where
't may be dangerous to human life
(People v. Sands, I Johns. 78; Cheat-

ham v. Shearon, I Swan 213); even a
dwelling-house, -if kept in a filthy state,
or so as to create danger of contagion
(State v. Pierse, 4 McCord 472 ; Meeker
v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 387); a
bowling-alley, gaxhing-house, or public
-liquor-store --(State v. DQon, R. M.
Charl. 1; Tanner i. Albion, 5 Hill
121 ; State v. Bertheol, 6 Blackf. 474;
State v. Haines, 30 .Me. 65); the corruption of water by the discharge into
it of sewage, or even by the use of it
for mechanical or manufacturing purposes (Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wellb
Law Rep. 1 Ch. 349; Smith i%.
M
Conathy, 11 Miss. 517 ; Lewis v. Stein.
16. Ala. 214; Howell v. McCoy, 3
Rawle 256). Some occupations may
be nuisances in a populous neighborhood, though innocent in a proper situation, as slaughter-houses (Brady v.
Weeks, 3 Bhrb. 157; Peck-v. Elder,
3 Sandf. Sup. Ct. 126); soap or fat-,
boiling factories (Howard v. Lie, 3
Id. 281 ; Cropsey v. Murphy, 1 Hilt n
126) ;"
manufactures attended with great
noise (Crump v. Lambert, Law Rep. 3
Eq. '409 ; Scott v. Firth, 10 L. T. N. S.
240; _IKsh V. Dodge, -4Detio.. 311);
the use of a dock for the landing of
emigrant passengers (Brower v. New
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ork, 3 Barb. 254). And in such a
rase it is no defence that the business
was begun when there were no inhabitants in the vicinity, more than twenty
years before: Comnw.nwealth v. Upton,
6 Cray 473; Douglass v. State, 4 Wis.
387; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157.
The running of railroad cars past a
church on Sunday may be a nuisance
(Frst Baptist Church v. S. 4- T. Bailway, 5 Barb. 79), but it is the worshippers, not the proprietors, who are damaged (Sawt -. Utica 6- S. ARailway, 6
Id. 313); aud in Willams v. N. Y.
Cental Railway, 18 Id. 222, the court
hel 'that it must be a peculiar' case
vhere real estate was injured by the
r"ual concomitants of the passage of a
cailroad train. See BelTv. 0.4 . P. Rail-ay, 25 Penna. St. 161; Geiger v.
.Tlor, 8 Fla. 325; 2 Redfield on Railways (3t ed.).
226. Other pursuits
-qay be nuisances or not according to
the manner in which they are conducted
ana the. surrounding -ircumstances,
4. g., a boarding or livo-. stable (Daraan v. Waddil, 9 Ired 244; Kfrkman
v. Handy, 11 Humn2 406; Coker v.
Bilge; 10 Ga. 3361 - steam-engine
tDavidson v. Iqham. I Stockt. 16), and
gasworks (Carhart v. Gas Co., 22 Barb.
297 ; Beg. v. Gas ts. 18 Jur. 146; 8
Cox C. C. 317). Brickmaking has
'been held a nuisan.e to adjoining land
(Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & S. 315),
but only when done in an improper
place, so as to take away the enjoyment
of life or property (Hole v. Barlow, 4
C. B. N. S. 334; Cavey v. Ledbitter, 3
Fost. & Fin. 14) ; and in .Beardmore v.
Treadwell, 3 Giff. 683, it was held to
constitute a nuisance where the defendant, having contracted to supply bricks
for fortifications, had erected brick-kilns
three hundred and forty yards from the
plaintiff's mansion, and close to her
boundary. Whether brickmaking is a
nuisance depends on the circumstances :
Cleeve v. Mahoney, 9 W. R. 882. To

constitute a nuisance, there must be real
and sensible damage, having regard to
the situation and use of the 'property
injured: Scott v. Firt, 4 Fost. & Fin.
349 ; and this is a question for the jury:
Pinckney v. Ewens, 4 L. T. Y(. S. 741.
The principles governing these actions
are well summed up in the Exchequer
Chamber, in the case of Tipping v.
Smelting Co., 4 B. & S. 60S (s. c.,
House. of Lords, 11 Jur. N. S. 785),
that every man must so use his own
property as not to injure that of his
neighbor, unless by reason of the lapse
of time he has acquired a prescriptive
right to do so. But the law does not
care for trifling inconveniences, and
looks at everything from a reasonable
point of view; and therefore, in an
Action for injury to property by noxious
vapors arising from the land of another,
the injury must be such as visibly to
diminish its value, comfort, and enjoyment. In determining this question,
the time, the locality, and all the circumstances, should be considered. And
where great works are carried on, which
are the means of developing the national
wealth, persons must not stand on extreme rights and bring actions for every
petty annoyance. And see Bamford v.
Turnley, 3 B: & S 66 ; Stockport Waterworks v. Porter, 7 Hurls. & .N. 160.
The cases, of excavations on owe's
own land, whereby the adjoining property of another is injured, though
sometimes attempted to be supported by
reasoning within the doctrine of the
principal case, seem rather to be governed by the law of easements. See
.Broon v. Windsor, 1 C. & J. 20; Bradbee v. Hospital, 2 ])owl. N. 9. 164;
Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 B. & Ad. 871;
Peyton v. London, 9 B. & C. 725 ; Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220; Cooper
v. Barber, 3 Taunt. 99; Hide v. Thornborough, 2 Car. & K. 250. But it is
sometimes hard to distinguish under
which head a case is to be ranked:
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Trower v. Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C.
334; s. c., 3 Scott 699 ; 8 Id. 1; Dodd
v. Bolnre, I Ad. & E. 393; Humphreys
v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; Jeffries v.
Williams, 5 Exch. 792; Taylor v.
Stendall, 7 Q. B. 634.
At common law, trespassers on land
cannot complain of any erection by the
owner thereof, whereby they have received injury.
This principle was
applied in England, before stat. 7 & 8
Geo. 4, c. 18, to the case of a trespasser
in a wood in which he knew that there
were spring-guns: Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B.
& Ald. 304. But the trespass must not
have been induced by such owner:
Townsend v. Watken, 9 East 277. See
Dean v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489; Bird
v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 728; Jordin v.
Crump, 8 Mees. & W. 782. And persons using for their own benefit land
subject to a public easement are liable
for all damage happening to others by
reason of negligence in such use: Pioc;
tor v. Barris,4 Car. & P. 337; Daniels
Y. Potter, Id. 262 ; Drew v. N. R. Co.,

6 Id. 754; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pcnna
St. 463. And this principle applies to
the occupant of a house with an area
on a public street (Coupland v. Harding.
ham, 3 Camp. 39a; Barnes v. Ward, 2
Car. & K. 661), and to persons working
a quarry near the highway. (Reg. v.
Mutters, 11 L. T. N. S. 386); but it
must be close to the highway (Hounsell
v. Smith, 7 C. B. N. S. 731), and the
plaintiff must have exercised due care
(Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200; Baltimore
v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; Crommelin T.
Coe, 30 Ala. 318). Perhaps-we may
include under the same principle the
exposure of disgusting and.obscene pictures on or near a public place (.Reg.. v.
Gray, 4 Fost. & Fin. 73), or the doing
of anything to gather a large irowd in,
and thus obstruct, the highways of .a
city: People v. Cunningham, I Denio
524; Bakery. Commonwealth, 19 Penna.
St. 412 ; State v. Buckley, 5 Harringi
508.
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Di.strict oirit of Hfamilton County, Ohio..
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. EPHRAIM T. BROWN v. JOHN RITT AND
-

ANTHONY SHONTEN.

Under the Ohio statute, passed May 3d 11852, "to regulate the election of state
and county officers" (3 Curwen's Revised Statutes 1920), -after the polls of an
election have been once opened ,between the hours of six and ten in the morning"
in pursuance thereto, they cannot be "1closed" for any purpose until six o'clock
in the'afternoon, without. renddring the election illegal and void.

in the.nature of a quo warranto.
This ivas a proceeding to contest the legal right of the defendant, John Ritt, to exercise the office of mayor of the-vil.lage of
Mount Airy in the county of Hamilton. It appeared- that the
relator and the said John Ritt were opposing candidates for said
office at the election held on the first Monday of-April 1867.
Ritt received a majority of the votes cast, and the certificate of
INFORMATION
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the election was afterwards issued to him by the recorder of the
village.
The relator filed an information in the nature of a quo wa'ranto,
claiming that the election was void by reason of certain irregularities and misconduct on the part of the judges in conducting
it, and that, therefore, the old mayor, the defendant Shouter, continued inoffice. The matter relied on as vitiating the election
was the fact that tle officers of the election; after the polls had
been regularly opened, between the hours of 6 and 10 o'clock,
A. M., left the place of voting at about half past 11 o'clock,
A. m., taking with them -the ballot-box, and returned with it at
ab6ut half past l'o'lock, P. M., when the voting was resumed.
The answer of the defendant, Ritt, on this point was as follows:
"The polls of said election were opened between the-hours of 6
and 10 o'clock in the morning and closed at 6 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day, that is, the first Monday of April
aforesaid. This defendant admits that the-judges and clerks of
said election left the place of voting about the usual time for dinner in -that neighborhood, and were absent therefrom about one
hour, and that meanwhile they deposited the ballot-box in a place
of security; but he avers that this was done with the *consent
and upon the advice of the relator, Ephraim.T. Brown, who was
then and there a candidate for the office of mayor as aforesaid,
and with the'consent likewise of all the voters then and.there
assembled. He'denies .that said ballot-box'was then or at apy time
during the hours of the election as above stated, out of the custody or possession of the judges ; or that b r.reason of the matters
alleged in the information, or any of them, any qualified voter
of the village of Mount Airy was prevented'from voting or failed
to vote on said day and at said election."
There was no misconduct of the judges of the. election proved
or pretended except that by the consent of all persons present,
candidates and electors, they closed the ballot-box, depositea it in
a place of safe keeping, and went away to dinner, at about half
past 11 o'clock, remaining absent from one to two houis. It
did not appear that any elector had been prevented from voting,
or that any injury to any one was caused- or intended. There
was no dispute (after the court had decided in his favor a question upon the Naturalization Act of April 1802, § 4) that John
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Ritt had received a majority of all the votes cast, and unless the
election itself was totally void, had been elected.
George -. Pugh, on behalf of Ritt, did not deny that the
action of the judges was irregular, but contended that on quo
war.ranto the question, after passing behind the certificate of election, was only which of the claimants had, in fact, the highest
number of legal votes. And he insisted that inasmuch as the
defendant had proved affirmatively that neither the relator nor
any one else had suffered any disadvantage, a mere mistake of
duty on the part of the judges could not avoid the election.
Mr. Boefer rose to address the court on behalf of the defendant Shonter, the former mayor, but the court intimated that it was
not necessary to offer any argument on that side.
Mr.' Crapsey, on behalf of the relator, said that under this
intimation of the court, he would not offer any remarks.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-It was correctly stated by Mr. Pugh, as a
universal law governing all. elections, that, throwing aside mere
forms, the only question is, who has received the most legal votes ?
The point as to the want of the signatures of.tle judges to- the
papers touched a mere matter of 'form.. The object was only to
authenticate the paper; and it was competent to authenticate by
other means, as it was by the oath of the recorder. *So.also;.as
to the administration of an oath to the judges. They were sworn
as a matter of fabt,'and acted as judges defacto.
It was beyond dispute, however- that for about the space of two
hour's, the judges and clerk of. election left the polls and took the
ballot-box away, returning afterwards and resuming the election.
There is no pretence that the ballot-box was tampered with, but
that the judges rather acted it ignorance of what their duties
were.
The court is of opinion that such conduct on the part of the
judges goes to the sibstance of the election, and renders it void
intote. The statute prescribes that the polls shall be opened at
a given hour in the morning and closed at a given hour in the
* BRINKERHOFF,
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afternoon. It was the express design of the legislature that all the
t.ime between these hours the polls should be kept open for the
convenience of any elector who may chose to present his ballot.
The court does not agree with counsel that it lies on the party
contesting the election to show affirmatively that the closing the
polls influenced the result. The law gives the elector the privilege of consulting his own convenience as to what hour of the
iay he will visit the polls, and it is a fair presumption that if the
polls were temporarily closed for dinner, as was proved, a portion
of the electors were deprived of that* pril'ilege. The writ was,
thdrefore, well brought against Mr. Ritt, who claimed the majority,
but the same state of facts also excludes Mr. Brown, the relator,
from the office of mayor.
MURDOCK,

Cox, and FoRcE, JJ., concurred.

In the case of The Penn District
Election, 2 Pars. (Penna.) 533, where
the polls, through mistake of the law
by the election officers, were closed at
8 o'clock, instead of 10, in the evening, as required by law, the election
was held void. - The court laid down no
defiuite rule as to how much of a variation was necessar to make the election
void ;'but PRsoNs, J., was of opinion
that if an election was closed dn hour,
or even half an hour, before the time
fixed by law it should be set aside, unless it appeared, from an exaiination
of the number of votes compared with the
tally-lists, that the number left out could
not by possibility change the result.
And where the polls were kept open
after the proper hour, if enough votes
were cast to change the result, the election must be set aside. A legal voter
rannot be interrogated as to whom he
voted for, although.he voted after the
proper time of closing the- polls; -and

therefore, the court cannot go into any
examination of the votes; it is enough
if the votes improperly received could
by possibility change the result: Locust •
Ward Case, 4 Penna. Law J. 341.
In Illinois, however, a different rule
was laid down, that to make the election
void it must be shown that votes were
cast after the proper hour for closing
the polls which changed the result. Itis not enough that the votes thus received, if all of one kind, would change
the result: the -court will not presume
one way or the other, and proof must
be made of .which side the votes thus
cast were for Piatt v. The People, 29
IEls. 54..
But an election will not be *setaside
becaust the polls were closed at the hour
specified by the Act of Assembly, though
a number of legal voters who were present and intending to vote werQ thereby
Clark's Case, 2 Pars.
prevented:
J. T. M.
(Penna.) 525.

McCRAMER v. THOMPSON.

Supreme Court of -I.owa.
McORAMER v. THOMPSON el al.
Where the principals and three sureties signed a promissory note, after which
and before delivery, by an arrangement between the principals and the surety
who -first signed the. note, his name was erased therefrom without the knowledge
or consent of the other sureties ; and the note was then delivered to-the payee in a
condition which showed upon its face that the name 'ofthe surety who first signed
the same had been erased; whereupon the note was received with knowledge of the
relation of principal andsurety existing between the makers: it was held: 1st.
That the discharge of the surety released the co-sureties who signed the note when
his name was upon it. 2d. That the payee received the note under circumstances
which would put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry; and was charged with
that if the makers
of the co-sureties. It was also Aeld,°
knowledge of the rig'hts
of the note were all principals the erasure of the name of one would be a discharge of the others only pro tanto.

THE appellants, Thompson and Sawyer, were the sureties of
Monett and Chipman, upon a joint note; payable -to plaintiff,
dated February 1st 1861, due in six months, for $497.10. Plain-'
tiff had a claim against, the "Lee and Des Moines Bridge Com"
pany." Monett and Chipman' leased the bridge. and made this
note to pay this debt, which they in suchocontract of lease Wi.d"
assumed.
Thompson was a stckholder in the bridge company; Sawyer"
was not., At the time they signed" the note; on Tonkinson had
signed it-the principal assured them that others would sign.
With this understanding they affixed their signatures, and the
name of James A. Crabtree was afterward procured. !Before the
note was delivered to plaintiff (or his attorney) Tonkinsbn's
name was.erased Or defaced, by an arrangement with the prinei'
-pals, and Crabtree's name was cut- off, so that no trace thereof
remained.
When the note was received by plaintiff, it is uncertain whether
he had knowledge that any of the parties were sureties. He did
know,.however, for he could see, that Tonkinson' name had been
to it. Chipman, the party delivering it, was at the time interro,
rogatel as to the erasure, 'and answered that the parties had consented to it, or that it was done by consent'of parties. Appellants
did not know that Crabtree actually signed the note, nor that the
two names (Tonkinson's and Crabtree's) were erased or cut off
until long after it was delivered. They knew that the object in
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making the note was to satisfy plaintiff, and to'enable the principals and the company to complete their arrangements for leasing
the bridge. The names were signed in the following oider:Monett, Chipman, Tonkinson, Thompson, Sawyer. Tonkinson's was
erased after Thompson and Sawyer signed. Crabtree signed after,
and after the erasure subsequently took his name off; but of such
erasure or spoliation Thompson and Sawyer had no knowledge.
Upon these facts, under the instructions, the jury found for plaintiff, and the sureties appeal.
o. C.

B. J. Hfall, for the appellants.

. D. Browning, for the appellee.
WRIGHT, J.-The action of the court in admitting the note,
without evidence froii plaintiff explanatory of its appearance and
condition, scarcely demands attention. The subsequent proof so
fully and entirely developed the' whole transaction, that such
preliminary question ceases to be of -any importance. Having
the entire evidence, appellants' liability or non-liability depends
upon the consideration of certain legal propositions, and, these
determined, it is of no consequence whether the note was properly
or improperly admitted in the first instance.- We remark, also,
that the material inquiry relates to the erasure of the name of
Tonkinson, foi his name was to the note at the time the sureties
signed it, and was erased-afterward, and before the delivery, and
without their knowledge or consent; and that it had-been erased
was known to plaintiff at the time the note was received. Crabtree, on the other hand, signed it after they did, and-plaintiff had
no knowledge or intimation that he had so sIgned. If-the circumstances attending the Tonkinson signature, therefore, are not
sufficient to release' the sureties, of course those .attending Crabtree's would not; and if they are sufficient, the defence is probably fatal to plaintiff's right to recover, and the judgment mdist be
reversed. So that, in any event, we may confine ourselves:to the
effect of the Tonkinson erasure, for, whatever the conclusion, it,
in one view at least, becomes decisive of the whole case.
We are left to presumption as to the time the erasure was
made. That it was made before the note was delivered to the
payee, is one of the conceded facts of the case. 'If the alteratiop
or erasure had taken place after its issue, after the note had aome
-
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to plaintiff's hands, very different questions would arise: fall v.
Meffe7iry, 19 Iowa 521. Made before, he having knowledge
that it was made at some time prior and by some one, the question
is whether, as a prudent man, he was justified in taking the note
without making other and further inquiries than he did; and
whether, taking under the circumstances disclosed in the testimony, he is protected as an innocent holder. And this involves
the somewhat correlative inquiry, whether, after the sureties had
signied the note and intrusted its delivery and the consummation
of the contract to the principals, they must suffer the consequences
of this change or erasure, or whether the law imposes upon the
payee the duty of ascertaining for himself the actual circumstances
attending the same; and whether, after being put upon inquiry,
he fails to follow it up, he should not be treated as having a
knowledge of all the facts to which such investigation would have
led him.
In the examination of these questions we shall treat plaintiff as
a holder for-value, or place him in the same attitude as though
h had, at the time the note was delivered, paid a full considera.tion for the. same. Whether,. under the facts, he should be so
rpgarded we need not determine. For, conceding this much, our
opinion is, that the verdict was nevertheless wrong, and that a
new trial should have been ordered.
And this conclusion we reach -without ..entering upon .the
much controverted question of what would be plaintiff's right,'if
there had been no change in the signatures after the sureties had
signed the note, 'or if it stood alone upon the effect of- the representations made by the principals- that they would procure other
sureties before delivering the note to the payee. We need hardly
remark that upon this question there is an irreconcilable conflict
in the authorities ; and-.while the writer of this opinion, at least,
inclines to concur in the view that the payee of negotiable paper,
taking it without notice of such representations or understanding
or anything to put -him upon inquiry, would not be bound nor
affected thereby, and .as a consequence that such defence could
not avail; yet as the question does not arise, it is left open for
future consideration. In some of the recent cases, it has. under
gone a very full discussion. Among others we refer to Willet -v.
Parker, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 608; Bank of Missouri v. .PhilUps, 17
Mo. 29; Dardoff v. -or8eman, 24 Ind. 481, all holding that
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such defence would not be available. *ontra, see People v. .Bostwick, 43 Barb. 9; s. c. 32 N. Y. 445; Perry v. Patterson, 5
Humph. 133. In addition to these we have examined the following cases and authorities, all bearing with some directness upon
the question here involved: Bibb v. 'Bead, 3 Ala. 88 ; Hatcher
v. Austin, 11 Verm. 447 ; Black v. Lamb, 1 Beasley (N. J.)
108; Bank v. Evans; 3 Green (N. J.) 155 ; Johnson v. Baker,
*6 Eng. L. & Eq. 470; Leaf v. Gibbs, 4 0. & P. 464; Sharp v.
United States, 4 Watts 21; Chouteauv. Suydam, 21 N. Y. 179;
Fay v. Richardson, 7 Pick. 91 ; Greav'es v. Neiber, 10 S. & M. 9;
Cumberledge v. Lawser, 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 228; Pawling v.
United States, 4"Or. 219 ; Corbett v. Miller, 43 Barb. 305; .2
Pars. N. & B. 28; Pasgumpsie Bank v. Coss, 31 Verm. 315;
Dixon v. Samer Id. 450 ; Smith v. Doak, 8 Texas 215 ; Hill v.
Sweet, 5 N. H. 168 ; -Dunnv. Smith, 12 S. & lvi. 602;. NVash v.
Skinner, 12 Verm. 219; Bank v. Kortiright, 22 Wend. 348;
Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45 , Thurston v. McKown, 6 Id.
428; Stover v. Logan, 9 Id. 59; Hall v. Fuller, 5 Bz & C. 750;
Charlesv. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 22; Bank Y. Woodworth, 18 Johns.
315 ; 1 Pars. N. & B. 110, 112, 232 ; Arode v. Dixon, 5 Eng. L.
& Eq. 512; Lloyd v. Howard, 1 Id. 227; Palmer v. Richards,
Id. 529; )eely v. The People, 27 Ill. 173 ; York Insurance Co.
v. Brooks (and note of Judge Redfield to these two last cases in
2 Am. Law Reg. 846; 3 Id. 402); Smith v. United States, 2.
Wallace 219; Goodman-v. Eastman, 4 N. H. 455; .Berry v.
Anderson, 22 Ind. 36; Pepper v. State, Id. 399.; Fertig v.
Buchu, 3 Barn. 308; Fullertonv. Sturge-s
i 4 Ohio 529; NPance
v. Lary, 5 Ala. 370; Montague v. Perkins, 22 L. & E. 516. %
Some of these cases relate to official bonds, some to acceptances
in blank, some to bonds of guardians or administrators, others to
deeds delivered to third -persons to be handed to the grantee unon
conditions, some where a name or names had been forged, others
where certain names were inserted in the instruments but not
signed to the same, some where the payee or obligee knew of the
promise to the sureties, while in 'others they did. not. Some make
a distinction between negotiable paper and official bonds; others
seem to overlook it. In some of-them the paper was used for a
purpose other than that contemplated, while many of them discuss
at great length, fully reviewing the authorities, the liability of
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sureties who sign upon the faith and condition that other names
are to sign also, the payee having no knowledge of such condition
or arrangement.
All the cases of the latter character recognise more or less
fully the principle stated in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 Term R. 73 ;
that whenever one of two innocent persons-must suffer by the act
of a third,. he who has enabled such person to occasion the loss
must sustain it. In some of them, however, its applicability is
denied ; while in others, each party claimed that he was innocent.
and that the other -had enabled the third person to occasion the
injury or loss. In others again, it is insisted that a surety may
hand a note to the principal to be delivered to the payee only
when'others named and agreed upon shall sign it; that in the
hands of the principal it is an escrow; and that a delivery before
the compliance with such conditions is void, and that the payee is
not protected. fOthers, as it seems to me with more reason, deny
that a note can thus be held as an escrow; maintaining that the
promissors" are one party, the promissee the other, and that an
instrument can only be delivered as an escrow to some third
person. All of the cases, however, where the iluestion arose,
hold that if the payee had knowledge of such an arrangement, he
would be bound by it, andjthat the defence would avail those who
signed upon the faith of such an agreement, and in like manner
none have been found which hold the payee or obligee prote.cted
where the circumstances were such as to put him upon inquiry.
This rule is recognise.d, in its negative form at least, in the note
of Judge Redfield to the case of The Insurance.Co. v; Broocs, 3
Am. Law Reg. 402, where he says: "It seems to us; upon prin.
ciple, that where there is nothing upon the face of the paper indicating that'other co-sureties were e'pected to become parties to the
instrument, and no fact brought to the knowledge of the obligee
before he accepts the instrument calculated to put him on his guard
in regard to that point, and which would naturally have led a
prudent'man, interdsted in the opposite dir~ction, to have made the
inquiry before accepting the security, the fault dannot be said to
rest, to any extent, upon -the obligee." Of course the conclusibn
.s legitimate, that if there was sufficient to put him upon-his guard,
or such information as would naturally lead him io make inquiry,
the obligee would be in fault, and phoulA. sustain the loss if any
arises. Again, he says (2 Am. Law Reg. 317): "The surety must
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run the risk of the fraud of his own agent, unless there is something upon the face of the paper to show that other parties were
expected to sign it. The payee may l e affected and put upon
inquiry by notice in pais, however, as well as by some indication
upon the instrument itself. In most of the cases it will be found
that this inquiry was naturally suggested by the paper itself. See
Thatcher v. Austin, 11 Verm. 447; Pawling v. United States,
4 Cranch 219; -Duncanv. United States, 7 Pet. 435. In one
case the rule is thus stated: "An estoppel (against the sureties)
does not exist in such cases, where thefe are circumstances calculated to put the obligee upon inquiry, or that may operate as notice
of the imperfect condition of the instrument; for in such case, the
obligee does not stand as an innocent party; his own negligence
is the proxiinate "cause of the injury he sustains :" Pepper v. The
State, 22 Ind..419; *and see Berry v. Anderson, Id. 36; Swan
v. The NYorth Brit. Austr. Lo., 10 Jur. 102 (7 0. B. 400).
Whether the principal violates* his agreement to obtain the
other rames promised; whether he fills a blank acceptance for
more than was agreed; whether he appropriates the note, to the
sureties' injury, to another purpose than that contemplated; in
any or all these cases, it must be conceded that as between them
it would be 'manifestly unjust and inequitable to hold the surety
liable. The surety may' most truthfully say "non veni in -hoc
vindulo." Tlhb difficu ty in all such cases arises when the rights
of third persons intervene.
When we come to consider these, however, it must be remembered that the law imposes the obligations of good faith and diligence, upon' a payee as well as upon a promissor or obligor.
Neither can protect himself from the consequences of his own
negligence. And where one has acted in good faith and exercised due diligence, and the other is fairly and naturally put.
upon inquiry and fails to follow it up, the latter cannot say we
are equally innocent. If he accepts an instrument, incomplete
upon its face, and giving clear indications that it has, been
changed, he cannot in justice and truth say, I am innocent, and
the surety must recover for any injury he has sustained against
the principal for his fraudulent misconduct.
In our investigations we have found no case precisely like that
before us. Upon principle, however, the analogy is clear enough.
VoL. XV-7
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Here was a joint note. When presented to the payee, one of the
names was obliterated or erased. This'could be seen, was seen
and talked about. This name was prior in place to those of the
present appellants. It was there clearly and unquestionably when
they signed it. Appellee knew, therefore, that the name of Tonkinson was at one time to this note. He knew it just as well as
though all' the names of the promissors had been recited in the
body of the note, and one of them (say Tonkinson) had failed to
sign it. In such a case there is but little if any question, under
the authorities cited, as to the rights of the other promissors, and
the duty of diligence on -the part of the payee. In the absence
of fraud both parties in such a case may 8stand upon the "facts,
and their rights are to be adjudged accordingly. For if the
inquiry thus suggested had been followed up, appellee would haye
learned the true state of-the case, and knowing this there.could be
no pret.elnce of a'right to recover.
The note then being in this condition, he was put upon inquiry.
Thus situated, did he manifest the diligence required by law?
He inquired of the principal, who advised him "that the parties
had consent~d to it." This -was untrue, and plaintiff was not
justified in relying upon such* representations. :If the act, of
erasing the name of one of the sureties, witholit the cbusent of
the others, would not conclude those not assenting, most clearly
a representation of this kind would not. 'PIaintiff's duty, being
put upon his guard,. was to go to a source where he .,could certainly learn the truth-to those who, failing to indicate their
dissent; would be thereby estopped.
But if he could simply.rely upon the. assertion of the prindipal
under the- circumstances, so he might if the appellants', names had
been forged, and he 'relied upon 'the principal's averment that
they were genuine. We have- found no case going so far as to
conclude the other promissors by the act or representation of one,
where the instrument contains upon its face mitter calculated to
put the payee upon inquiry. And it must -be very clear that to
hold them so bound w~uld destroy all right or protection resulting
to them from the incomplete nature of the instrument., For, by
such misrepresentations, made by an interested party, it would
become invested with all the sanctity and validity of the most
perfect and regular paper or writing. Fdr the most. obvious reasons this cannot be the rule.
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The foregoing views of the law are based upon the supposition
that plaintiff knew at the time he received the note that. appellants were but sureties, and that Monett and Chipman were the
principals. Whether he had this knowledge is a question of fact
which should be submitted to the jury under the testimony. The
instructions do not seem to have regarded this inquiry as very
material, nor to have .discriminated with entire clearness between
appellants' rights, if known as sureties, instead of standing as
principals in common with the other makers. And in a case so
important to the parties, involving questions so difficult and somewhat novel in this state, we have had the less hesitation in ordering a new trial, that the attention of the jury might, under
proper instructions, be directed to this distinction and to these
inquiries.
If plaintiff or his agent, when taking the note or bef6re, knew
that appellants signed the note as sureties; then the rules abovo
stated and recognised should be given to'the jury for their guide.
Of course, if this was not known, but as far as he knew or had
reason to know they were all principals, then this erasure would
not operate to discharge appellants entirely, but only pro tanto
That is to say, they would still be liable for their proportion of
the debt, and to that extent plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
'We only remark, in conclusion, that there was no evidence
tending remotely to show that appelants, or either of them, had
made any payment upon this note. The instructions based upon
such assumption were therefore erroneous.Because of this, and because the law was not properly given to
the jury upon the main issue involved, as above indicated, the
cause is reversed, and remanded for trial de novo.
Reversed.
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IN THE MATTER OF CAMPBELL.

United States District Court. Western District of Pennsyl.
vania. In Bankruptcy.
IN THE MATTER OF HUGH CAMPBELL, A BANKRUPT.
Congres, by the Constitution of the United States, had the right to bring all
parties, estates, and interests connected with a bankrupt into the District Court
of the United States as a Court of Bankruptcy.
And to confer upon the,District Courts the authority to suspend all and every
proceeding elsewhere; and to command dbedience to their mandates, exclusive
of all other jurisdictions.
But, by the Bankrupt Act of the 2d March 1867, they have not done so.
This- act does not authorize the District Courts of the United States to issue
"njunctions to state courts, nor to the actors or parties litigating before them.
The. Act of 2d March 1793, prohibits it; and this act is not repealed by .the
Bankrupt Law, either in express terms, or by implication.
Courts of a state .are independent tribunals, not deriving their authdrity from
the same sovereign, and as regards the District Court of the United States, foreign
tribunals, every way its equal, and over which the District Court has no super- visory power.

The Bankrupt Law does not change the relation of these courts to each other..
The authority conferred by the 40th'section, to issue an injunction against tbe
bpmkrupt, and all other persons, has no. reference to .the state courts, and it is a
limitation of the sweeping provisions of the 1st-section.
It was designed to protect the property of a party not yet declared a bankrupt,
ntil his bankruptcy has been legally established.
Liens, by the Bankrupt Law, are held sacred, and the creditor is expressly. protected by the 14th, 15th, and 20th sections of the act.
The baikrupt's final certificate 'discharges his person and .future acquisitions
but the lien-creditor is entitled to satisfaction out of the property subject to lien.

-

Patterson,for the injunction.
Golden and Foster, contri.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
M'CANDLESS, J.-I feel the grave responsibility which attaches
to the decision about to'be announced.

Ifi construing a new and

untried statute, and establishing the pracice to be observed in
its proper administrati'n, there must necessarily be much divei-

sity of opinion among both lawyers and judges.

The interests

involved are frequently so large and the principles so important,
that inextricable confusion must refult from an unsound interpre-

tation of the legislation of Congress. TPhis Bankrupt -Act is
highly beneficial to both the debtor and the creditor. It was

IN THE MATTER OF CAMPBELL.

designed to relieve the one from oppressive liabilities, which
render him unfit to contribute to the productive wealth of the
country ; and it affords to the other an assurance that all the property of the debtor, except what from motives of humanity he is
permitted to retain, shall be honestly devoted to the payment of
his debts. With a fraudulent debtor it is wisely and justly strin
gent, compelling a full discovery and surrender of his assets, for
-the benefit of his creditors under peril of imprisonment for contempt-a penalty not to be disregarded.
The present is a case upon creditors' petition to declare Hugh
Campbell a bankrupt. Numerous acts of bankruptcy have been
assigned, all of which are denied, and a trial by jury awarded.
Many judgments of large amount, the validity of which is not
questioned, have been entered in the Court of Common Pleas of
Armstrong county ; and they are all prior in date to the period
when the Bankrupt Law went into. operation. Upon final process,
a sale of real estate by the sheriff has been made, and $29,290
realized and brought into court for listribution. Under these
circumstances our extraordinary power of injunction was invoked
to restrain not only the plaintiffs in these judgments,-but the
courts of the state and, their executive officers, from further proceeding, with the design to bring all the property of the bankrupt
into this courtas a Court of Bankruptcy, for division among all his
creditors. The injunction against the sheriff and the parties was"
granted, with leave, in'tanter, for a motion to dissolve, that we
might ascertain whether, under the Bankrupt Law, we have the
right to interfere with the courts of the state in the legitimate
exercise of their functions.
After much reflection I am satisfied we have not-nor with the
actors or parties litigating before them.
The first section of the act is wide in its scope, 'and would seem
to bring all parties, estates, and interests connected with thebank.
rupt into a common forum or centre. And to do so, it is contended that Congress, by implication, conferred upon the District
Courts bf the United States the authority to suspend all and every
proceeding elsewhere, and to command obedience to their mandates, exclusive of all other jurisdictions. This, by virtue of the
5th clause of the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution
of the United States, granting the power "to establish uniform laws
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on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States,"
Congress had the right to do-but they have not done so.
Staring them in the face was the Act of the 2d of March 1793.
§ 5th, expressly declaring, "nor shall a writ of injunction be
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state." There is
nothing in the Bankrupt Law in terms repealing this statute, and
the authority conferred by the 40th section to issue an injunction
against the bankrupt and all other 'persons,excludes the presumption that it is to be exercised without limitation. Other "persons," here- expressed, has reference to parties interfering with
the property of an individual not yet adjudicated an involuntary
bankrupt, and which is to be preserved inviolate, until his bankruptcy has been legally ascertained. It does not refer to the
courts of a state, or to their executive officers. It was not
designed to .arrest the whole machinery of another and independent forum, which is exercising its best efforts to marshal the
assets of the debtor, and after discharging the legitimate liens to
which they are subject, reserving the residue as a fund for the
assignee in bankruptcy..
Liens by this law, as they should be, are held sacred. To say
that the vigilant creditor, who by his diligence has secured his.
debt, and has a valid lien upon the property of the bankrupt,
shall come in with all the other creditors pro rata, would be a
perversion of the purposes of Congress in the passage of the -act.
No right acquired by the creditor is affected or impaired. The
14th section expressly -protects him. The assignee has authority,
under the direction of this court, to discharge any lie upon any
property, real or personal, and is authorized to sell. the game
subject to, such lieii or other encumbrances. By the 15th sectioii
he is permitted to sell all unencumbered estates, real and personal, on such terms as he thinhs most for the' interest of the
creditors. Where there is a.lien on real or personal property,
the 20th section admits the holder of the lien as a creditor in
bankruptcy for the balance of the debt,-after deducting the value
if the property, to be ascertained by agreement or sale ; or .bp
creditor may release or convey his claim to the assignee, ind be
permitted to prove his whole debt in bankruptcy..
These several sections are distinct recognitions by Congress "of
the sanctity of liens, obtained before the ifiception'of. proceedings
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in bankruptcy, and they control, ana are a limitation of the
sweeping provisions of the first section. It is among the elementary principles with regard to the construction of statutes,
that every section, provision, and clause of a 'statute shall be
expounded by a reference to every other. The most general and
absolute terms of one section may be qualified and limited by
conditions and exceptions contained in another, so that all may
stand together.
All liens then remain intactL The bankrupt's final certificate
6perates to discharge his person and future acquisitions, while, at
the same time, the mortgagee or other lien-creditor shall be permitted to have their satisfaction out of the property mortgaged or
subject to lien. A legal right without a remedy would be au
anomaly in the law: 7 How. 623.
It is true that the first section of the act declares, that the
jurisdiction conferred on the District Court of the United States
shall extend to "1all cases and controversies arising between the
bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any debt
or demand under the bankruptcy." But .as the Supreme Court
of the United States say, in the case of Peck v. Ten.nes, before
quoted in 7 Howard, the Court of Common Pleas of Armistrong
county has. full and complete jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject-matter ; and its jurisdiction had attached long before
any jct of b'nkruptcy was committed. It is an independent.
tribunal, not deriving its authority from the same sovereign, and,
as regards the District Court, a foreign forum, in every way its
equal. The District Court has no supervisory power over it.
When the jurisdiction of a Court, and the right of a plaintiff to
prosecute his suit in it, have once attached; that right cannot be
arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court. These
rules have their foundation not merely in comity, but in necessity..
For if one may enjoin the other may retort by injunction, and
thus the parties be without remedy; being liable to a process for
contempt in one if they dare to proceed in the other. Neither
can one take property from the custody of the other by replevin
or other process, for this would produce a conflict "ofjurisdiction
extremely embarrassing in the administration of justice. The
fact, therefore, that an injunction issues only to the parties before
the court and not to the court itself, is no evasion of the diflicul-
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ties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that
power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent
forum. "
It follows, therefore, that this court has no supervisory power
over the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong county by injunc.
tion or otherwise, unless it is conferred by the Bankrupt Law.
But we cannot discover any provision in that act which limits the
jurisdiction of the state courts, or confers any power on the
Bankrupt Court to supersede their jurisdiction, or wrest property
from the custody of their offiers. On the contrary it provides,
in the 14th section, that.the assignee "may prosecute and defend
all suits at law or in equity, pending at the time of the idjudication of bankruptcy, in whichi such bankrupt is a party, in his
own name, in the same manner and with the like effect, as they
might have been prosecuted or defended by such bankrupt." In
other words, as -to the estate and property of the bankrupt, the
assignee is subrogated to all his rights and responsibilities. The
act sends the assignee to the state court, and admits its power
-over him. It confers no authority on this court .to restrain proceedings therein, by injunction or other process; much less to
take property out of its custody or possession with a strong hand.
Finding no such grant of power, either in direct terms or by
necessary implication,'from any of the provisions of the Bankrupt Law, we are not at liberty to interpolate it'on any supposed
grounds of policy or expediency. We shall therefore be compelled
to dissolve this and all other injunctions in similar cases.
I have not submitted this-opinion to my brother GRiR ; but it
may, be a source of gratification to the profession to -learn that,
sitting with him recently, at Circuit in Philadelphia, we conferred
upon this -case, and I am pleased to say that we concurred in the
legal principles upon which it should be decided:
Injunction dissolved.

IN THE MATTER OF BURNS.

United States -DistrictCourt. Western -Districtof Pennsylvania. In Bankruptcy.
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM BURNS.
The principle decided in Campbell's Case, that the District Courts of the United
States have no power to issue injunctions to state courts, affirmed.
A judgment cannot be assailed in the Bankrupt Court, but the assignee and
creditors must resort to the state court, to test its validity.

Purviance, for the Clarion Bank.
Harsha11, for the Sheriff of Jefferson county.
Shiras, for the bankrupt and general creditors.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
M'CANDLESs, District Judge.-This case was argued at the
same time with that of Hugh Campbell, and the principal point
presented has been there decided.
It differs in this-Burns is a voluntary bankrupt. His petition
was filed on the 31st of July 1867, and he was duly adjudged a
bankrupt. The First National Bank of Clarion, a creditor of the
firm of which the bankrupt was a partner, on the 18th of July
1867 obtained judgment on warrant of attorney dated 9th of July
of the same year, for the suin ot $10,300. A fi. fa. was issued
and 'a levy made by the .sheriff of Jefferson county on merchan-"
dise and lumber, at -wt~at date, from. the imperfecti6n of the
paper-book, this court is unable to say, but .prior in date to the
commencement of the prbceedings in bankruptcy.
It was alleged at the arguient, that the note on which this
judgment is predicated was given under promise not to sue out a
writ of, execution, but to be held as a security, and to afford the
firm of which the bankrupt was a partner, an opportunity to make
some irrangement with their creditors. That in violation of this
Agreement, and in fraud of the 35th section of the Bankrupt Law,
the judgment was entered, execution was issued, and levy made.
Before the date fixed by the sheriff for his sale, we were asked, by
petition, to enjoin the Clarion Bank and the sheriff from proceeding farther with their .writ, and directing them to deliver the property upon which the levy was made to the assignee in bank.
ruptcy. This we did; at the same time admonishing the counsel
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of the doubts entertained as to the power of this court, and sug.
gesting a motion to dissolve, which was granted. Upon this point
they haVe been fully heard, and the question has been decided today in Campbell's Case.
It was urged with great force and ability by the counsel for
the .bankrupt, that we were bound to interfere by injunction,
because, this was not a"valid judgment. But how do'we know
that ? It is entered in a court of competent jurisdiction, whose
authority it is our duty to 'respect. If it is fraudulent or void
under the Bankrupt Law, it is the province of the *assignee in
bankruptcy, who stands inthe attitude of a defendant, to see, in
that forum, that'no injustide is done to the general creditors.
By the 1st section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the
United States, it is declared that "full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial pro-.
ceedings of every other state ;" and this is equally binding on the
Courts' of the United States.
We must, therefore, refer the assignee in bankruptcy, as the
representative of the defendant, and of all the creditors, to the
Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson county.
dissolved.
S-Injunction

Supreme Cgurt of )Pennsylvanza.
HARTLEY & MORRIS'S APPEAL.
To impart'an irrevocable quality to a power of attorney, in the absence of any
express stipulation, and as the result of legal principles alone, there'must co-exist
with the poiver, an interest in the thing or estate to be disposed of or managed,
under the power.
In a power of attorney constituting an orilinary agency .to enforce settlement
of an administrator's account, and to collect any moneys or property that might
belong to grantor, a clause allowing 'ihe attorneys to have.for their seryices onehalf 6f the net proceeds of What they might recover' or'receive, does not render
the power irrevocable.

APPAL

from the Orphans' Court of Greene county.

.Downey, for plaintiff .in error.
Purmaan, contrg.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
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THOMPSON, J.-There was no error committed by the court
below in holding the power of attorney of Hannah Gallion to the
appellants to be revocable. It was an ordinary agency,'constituted by letter of attorney to act for her, to enforce a settlement
of his accounts by the administrator' of her father's estate, in
which she was interested, and to collect any moneys or property
that might belong or be coming to her. For these services the
attorneys were to have one-half the net proceeds of what they
might recpver or receive for her. The plaintiffs in error suppose
that this clause rendered the power irrevocable by their principal,
under the idea that it was a power coupled with an interest. This
was'a mistake, as ill the. authorities -show. To impart an irrevocable quality to a power of attorney, in the absence of any express
stipulation, and as the result of legal principles alone, there must
co-exist with the power an interest in the thing or estate to be
disposed of or managed under the power. An instance, of frequent occurrence in practice, may be given of the assignment of
vessels at sea, with a power to sell on return for the benefit of the
holder 'of the power, or of anybody else who may have advanced
money, and who it was agreed should be secured in that way.
So, when securities have been transferred, with a power'to sell,
and generally, I presume, in all cases of property pledged for
the security of money, where there is an accompanying authority
to sell to reimburse the lender or creditor. In Hunt v. .Rousmahier, 8 Wheat. 400, this doctrine is clearly and forcibly elucidated
in the opinion of MAISHALL, C. J. In Bancroft v. Ashurst, 2
Grant 513, a case tried .at Nisi Prius before me, at which my
brethren sat as advisers, there is a pretty full examination of the
question herein involved, and all the authorities referred to, and
the conclusion is fully in accordance with Hunt and Rousmanier,
and sustains the above view of a power coupled with an interest.
In the case in hand the power and the interest could not coexist. The interest the appellants would have would be -in the
net proceeds collected under the power, and the exercise, of the
power to collect the proceeds would, ipso facto, extinguish it
entirely, or so far as exercised. Hence the appellants' interest
would properly begin when the power ended.. This distinction is
noticed in Hunt v. Rousmanier; but neither by this test, nor any
other, was the power of attorney in question irrevocable, and the
judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

BLACKSTONE v. BUTTERMORE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BLACKSTONE v. BUTTERMORE.
In order to make an agreement for irrevocability, contained in a power Ao
transact business for the benefit of the principal, binding on him, there must be a
consideration for it independent of the compensation to be rendered for the service
to be performed.
Where, in a power with a clause of irrevocability, the agreement.was to give th3
agent a certain sum and portion of the proceeds of the sale he was authorized to
make, for his compensation, and he expended time, labor, and money thereunder,
the power was not thereby rendered irrevocable.
For the time, labor, and money expended, a revocation would leave the prin

cipal liable on his implied assumpsit.
Hartley 4- Morris's Appeal (ante, p. 106), cited and approved.

ERROR to Common Pleas bf Fayette County.
Patterson,for plaintiff in error.
Kaine,'contrA.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGN-xEw, J.-We have decided the substantial point of this
case, at the present term, upon the Appeal of Hfartley J' Morris,
from the Orphans' Court of Greene' county, opinion by TiRompsoN, J. A power of attorney, constituting a mere agency, is
always revocable. It is only when coupled with an interest in
the thing itself, or the estate which is the subject of the power, it'
is deemed to be irrevocable ; as where it is a security for money
advanced, or is to be used as a means of effectuating a purpose
necessary to protect the rights of the agent, or others. A mere
power, like a will; is in its very nature revocable when it concerns
the interests of the principal alone; and in such case even an
express declaration of irrevocability will not prevent revocation.
An interest in the proceeds to arise as, mere compensation for
the service of executing the power, will not make the power irrevocable. Therefore it has been held that .a mere employment to
transact the business of the principal is not irrevocable without
an express covenant founded on sufficient consideration, notwithistanding ihe compensation of the agent is to result fromi the business to be performed, and to be measured by its extent: Coffin v.
Landis, 10 Wright 426. In order to make an agreement for irre.
vocability, contained in a power to transact business for the benefit
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of the principal, binding on him, there must be a consideration for
it, independent of the compensation to be rendered for the service
to be performed. In this case the object of the principal was to
make sale solely for his own benefit. The agreement to give his
agent a certain sum, and a portion of the proceeds, was merely to
sell. But what obligation was there upon him to sell, or what
other interest beside his own was to be secured by the sale?
Surely his determination to sell for his own ends alone, was revo.
cable. If the reasons for making a sale had ceased to exist, or
he should find a sale injurious to his iliterests, who had a right to
say he should iot change his mind ? The interest of the agent
was only in his compensation for, selling, and without a sale this
is not earned. A revocation could not injure him. If-he had
expended money; time or labor, or all, upon the business intrusted
to him, the power its'elf was a request to do so; and bn.a revocation would leave the principal liable to him, on his implied assump-sit. But it would be the height of injustice if the power should
be held to be irrevocable, -merely to secure the agent for his outlay or'his services rendered before a sale.
The following authorities are referred to: Hunt v. .Rousmanier,
8 Wheat. 184; Story on Agency, §§ 463, 464, 465, 468, 476,
477 ; Paley on Agency 155 ; 1 Parsons on Contracts 59 ; Irwin v.
Workman, 3 Watts 357 ;Smyth v. Craig, 3 W. & S. 20. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Circuit Court of the United States. -FasternDistrict of
.Pennsylvania.
BRETTAUGH v. THE 'LOCUST MOUNTAIN COAL AND IRON
COMPANY.
Whe;e the owner of an unseated tract, lying partly in county S., p4,cures a
survey, and returns to the county commissioners for taxation a description of the
land as 55 acres lying in S. county, part of a tract containing 349 acres, the residue lying in. N. county, with the warrantee's name, and it is so assessed, and
the taxes ar paid for two years, and in the following year the assessment is so
changed in name and quantity that the owner, seeking to pay the taxes, is unable
to ascertain that the tract is taxed, and therefore does not pay the tax, a sale for
such taxes does not pass the owner's title.

TniTs was an ejectment for one-third of 55 acres in Schuylkill
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county, tried before GRIER, J., at the October Sessions 1867,
of the Circuit Court of the United States.
The plaintiff shiowed a warrant to Win. Elliott in 1793, a survey, return and patent. ' A deed in 1829 for an undivided interest
in this and twelve other tracts to Henry Paul Beck: an assessment for Butler township, Schuylkill county, for 1850 and 1851,
thus :-

"Beck, Paul. 200' acres @ 10, 2000," followed by a treasurer's sale, in 1854,°regular in form, for the taxes of 1851-2,
and title from the purchasers to the plaintiff, with proof as to the
identity of the tract taxed with that surveyed under the Win.
Elliott warrant.
The defendants showed ti.le under the Win. Elliott warrant and
that they were in possession since 1853, making valuable improvements.
There. was no evidence that the tract had ever been assessed in
Schuylkill.county prior to 1848. In that year the owner, under
whom defendants *claimed, employed a surveyor to survey and
ieturn for taxation the thirteen tracts (known as the Beck lands),
lying in' the three counties of Northumberland, -Columbia, and
Schuylkill. The surveyor returned .a list of the lands to the
county commissioners in which this tract was set forth thus:in Northumberland
county.

In Columbia
county.

in SchnylkM
coflnty.

Total.

"William Elliott.
289.-1B
55:.61
344.219
In 1848 the assessor's book for Barry township, Schuylkill
county, showed the tract was assessed thus:"William Eliott. 55 as. DV part of 344'2 275.
.82 82
The residue being'-i .C61umbia county. See paper filed,"
In 1849.the assessment-was the same.
In March 1850, an agent of the owiers, who had been employed
to see to this return, paid the taxes for 1848-9, with interest, &c.
In .1850, the assessor's books showed, under-the unseated list,
an entry of a trict :with the quantity and. gross valuation carefully erased.
The re was some reason tb believe that with the aid of a powerful glass traces of the name "William Elliott," •could be seen
under the cancellation-.
Between this and the line next above was the assessment Beck
Paul, &c., under which the plaintiff claimed:
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The assepsment of 1851 was similar but without any erasure.
There was very clear proof this erasure and the insertion of the
na=3 Beck Paul had been done by the consent of the assessor
before the return of the assessment.
It was shown that in 1853 the owners of the lands were told by
their agent, in reply to inquiries, that he could learn nothing
about the tax. But-it also seemed evident that his inquiries had
been confined to .the supervisor.
In February 1853 the owner wrote to the attorney who had
lad charge of the return for taxation" in 1848, to inquire about
the.taxes, stating there *ere taxes for two years due. In reply
he was told by the attorney that he could not find anything to be
aue, that the land had not been assessed.
Within that y'ear the owner again returned this tract for'taxation in Schuylkill county, with a description similar to that made
in 1848, and it wag so assessed and continued to be so till put on
the seated list in 1854, since which the taxes had been regularly
paid.
It was also in evidence that in 1855 the tract, although properly
assessed for 1854 in the name of Win. Elliott, was sold to the
commissiondrs for the taxes of 1853-4, assessed under the name
of Beck Paul. This sale was redeemed in 1859 by the defendants.
T. . e'r lroy and ".Rarsons,for the plaintiff, contended that
the only question was the identity of the land sold with that
assessed under the name, of Beck Paul, as it'was shown he had
once been an owner, and the lands were known by his name it
the time of the assessment and the taxes had not been paid.
lfcurtrie and ffui es, for the defendants,* contended that
where the owner had done his duty in returning the land foi
taxation and had seen them properly assessed, if, by reasofi of a
change in the form of the assessment, he was misled and i duced
to believe the land had not been assessed, and was thereby pre.
vented paying the taxes, the assessment was not such as warranted
a sale for unpaid taxes; and on this they cited Dunn v. .Ralyea,
6 W. & S. 479; City v. Miller, 13 Wright 455; Baird v. Car
sen, 5 W. & S. 540; Larimer v. McCall, 4 Id. 133; Williston
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v. Colkit, 9 Barr 88; Laird v. ifeister, 12 Harris 453; Com.
Bank v. Woodeide, 2 Id. 404; Denisonv. Snodgrass, 6 Id. 154;
Gibson i. Snodgrass, 9 Watts 159.

GRIER, J., instructed the jury the questio0n was one of fact.
Such a change in the assessment after a return and an assessment
accordingly, without notice to or knowledge by the owner of the
change, whether this was through the-fraud or folly of the assessors,
and it mattered not which, vitiated the sale as against the owner
who had been misled, and endeavored to pay his taxes but failed
to discover them on the list, after having complied with ihe requisition of the law and given the officers of the Commonweblth full
information to enable them to tax the land properly.
'The jury found for the defendants.

C'ourt of Apveals of New York.
SARAH L. COOK, RESPONDENT,. v. SAMUEL M.MEEKER ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.
Where a sum is left by will in trust, with a direction that the interest andl
income shall be applied to the use of a person, such person is entitled to the interest from the date of testator's death.
Especially is this so where it appears to have been the intent of the testator that
the legacy should be paid by a transfer of bonds bearing intei.lt at,the time bf his
death.

THE appellants were executors of the will of Joseph Consellea.
and separate trustbes of certsin hums given by the will for'the"
use of certain beneficiaries therein-named.
By the seventh clause of the will the testator gave and
bequeathed the sum of $3000 upon *trust to invest the same on
'bond-and mortgage. and-apply the interest*nd income thereof te
the use of his granddaughter Sarah Cook, the plaintiff aerein.
during her natural lif6:
The testator declared, that in case any 'claim should be pre
sented and allowed against his estate in favor of. Dr. Ohauncey
1,. Cook, that the same should be paid rateably out of the princi
pal of several sums given to his grandehirdren, one of whom was
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t e plaintiff. He authorized and empowered his executors to pay
and discharge the several legacies and bequests made in his will,
or any or either of them, by transferring and delivering to the
several legatees such bonds and mortgages belonging to his
estate, to be selected by his executo'rs, as might amount either
severally or collectively to the legacy paid off.
In addition, the following facts were found by the court which
tried the case without a jury. That the testator died on the 10th
of October 1856, and that letters testamentary were issued to the
defendants on the 20th of December ih that year. That the tes.
tator left bonds and moftgages amounting to the sum of $39,121,
and that they were drawing interest at the time of the testator's
death. That the amount of the legacies and bequests was $21,000
given by the will; that there were no debts against the. estate
except the demand of Dr. Cook, mentioned in the will.; that the
estate was ample to pay all legacies; that there was a large real
and personal. estate drawing interest; that the executors took
possession and control of said estate 'from the time of the testator's d7eath; that the bonds and mortgages set apart for the payment of these bequests were -part of the estate left by the said
testator, and were drawing interest at and from the time of the
testator's death; that on the 3d day of June -1857, Dr. Cook presented to the executors a claim against the testator, duly verified,
amounting to' $426, which was afterwards allowed by them, and.
paid to him on the 19th of December 1857; that by.the ter~is
of the will three-sevefiths of this claim, amounting to the sum Pf
$116.18, were directed to be paid out of the principal sum of
$3000 bequeathed to the use of the plaintiff.
That on the 19th of December 1857, the defendant Meeker
received from the executors, for the use of the plaintiff and her
sister Ann for life, the sum of $5767.64, of which $5691 was in
mortgages and $76.64 in cash.
The plaintiff claimed the interest on said sum of $3000, from
the time of the death of the testator, and the defendants 'insisting
that she was only entitled to the interest and income thereof from
the 19th day of December 1857.
The judge at special term held that the money bequeathed to
the use of the plaintiff was a legacy, and was not payable until
the expiration of one year from the granting of letters testamentary, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest thereon
VOL. XVI.-8
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prior to December 20th 1857. Judgment was entered dismissing
the complaint, and an appeal to the General Term reversed tho
judgment and ordered a new trial. From this order the defendants have appealed to this court, and stipulated, that if the order
appealed from is affirmed, that judgment absolute shall be rendered against them.
J. H. Beykold8, for appellants.

S. C. Pinkney, for respondents.
C. J.-There does not appear to be much difficulty in.
adjuspting the rights of the arties, and the defendants would have
been held blameless if they had acquiesced - in the judgment of
the General Term of the Supreme Court, that the plaintiff was
entitled to the income of the same, set apart by the testator for
her support and- maintenance, from the time-of the deatli of -the
testator. The amount in controversy hardly justified them in
subjecting the plaintiff, or the estate they represent, to the-delay
and expense of an appeal to this court.
A bare reading of the will shows that the testator had tw(,
classes of beneficiaries in his mind; one to whom he intenided to
give absolute legacies, and the other those for whose support and
maintenance he intended to provide a*fund, for which purpose the
interest and incbme thereof were to be applied,' In the former
class, was the bequest of the sum of $6000 to his wife, the sum
of $2000 each to the two children of his son William, the sum of
$3000 6ach to his two grandchildren Anna L. Baker anid Micajah
R. Pinckney. In the latter class, is the bequest of the sumt of
$4000, the interest'and income of which was to be paid to his wife
during her natural life; the sum of $5000, the interest and
income of which was to be paid to his daughter,'married, during
her natural life; the sum of $5000, the interest and income of
which was to be. applied to the use of his/graidson Joseph Cook
during his natural life; the sum of V3000, the interest and
income .of which was to be applied to the use of his gran4.
daughter Anna Cook during her n.atural life.; and the gum of
$8000, the interest and income of which was to be applied to- the
use of his granddaughter Sarah Cook, the plaintiff, during lier
natural life.
By the provision of the Revised Statutes, no legacies are to be
DADAVIES,
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paid until after the expiration of one year from the time of granting letters testamentary, unless the same are directed by the will
to be sooner paid: 2 R. S., p. 90, § 43. This is an affirmance
of the doctrine of the common law, and has not changed the rule
as to the time when interest on legacies begins to run: 3 Brad.
Rep. 364.
At common law, the general rule is that interest upon a legacy
is payable only at the expiration of a; year from the testator's
death: Toller on Ex. 324; Bradnerv. Baulkner, 12 N. Y. Rep.
472. If, however, an annuity be given, or if 'by implication
from the terms of the instrument the legacy be given for maintenance and support-, it shall commence immediately from the death
of the testator, and consequently the first payment shall be made
at the expiration of the year next after that event : Toller on Ex.
324; Bradner v. Faulkner, ubi supra; 6 Yesey 539;.6 Paige
300. A learned author on the duties of executors (2 Williams
on'Ex. 1288), says: 1 This rule as to the Payment of interest is
subject to an exception, in case of the testator being a parent, or
in loca parentis'of the legatee: citing.Aecerly v. Vernon, 1
P. Wins. 783 ; Hill v. Hill, 3 V. & B. 183 ; Mills v. Roberts, 1
Russ. & M. 555 ; Leslie v. Leslie, Cas. Temp. Sugd. (Lloyd &
Goold) 4; Rogers v. Souther, 2 Keen 508; Wilson v. Maddison,
2 Y. & C. Oh. C. .72; Russell v. Dickson, Dr. & W. 133. .For
there, whether"the legacy be vested or contingent, if the legatee
be not an adult, interest on the legacy shall be allowed as a main.
tenance from the time-of the death of the testator, if t6ere is no
other provision for that purpose: Harveyv. Harvey, 2 P. Wims.
21; Ineledon v. Northeote, 3 Atk. 438; Chambers v. Godwin,
11 Yes. 2; Brown v. Temperly, 3 Russ. 'Ch. Cases 263; even
though the will should contain an express direction that the
interest shall accumulate: Mole v. Mole, 1 Dick. 310; MeDerMott v. Kealey, 3 Russ. Oh. Cases 264, note; Wyneh v. Wynch,
1 Cox 433; -Donovanv. NYeedham, 9 Beav. 164; Rudge v. Wirmall, 12 Id. 357; In re Bouse's -Estate,9 Hare 649.
In Mills v. Roberts, 1 Russ. & M. 555, the testator gave legacies to be paid to two minor children, provided they attained the
age of twenty-one years, and the question was whether they were
entitled to interest on their legacies of X10,000 each, for their
maintenance and education during their minorities; and he als"
gave a legacy to one George Francis Stuart, a minor, for his 83k
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use and disposal, provided he attains the age of twenty-one. The
Master of the Rolls said, the testator appoints two gentlemen to
be trustees and guardians of these children, and requests them to
attend to their education ; and the case of Branstrom v. Wilkinson is an authority directly in point, that they are entitled to
the interest of the sums given to them until they attain the age
of twenty-one, or die under that age. The same principle applies
to the legacy to George Francis Stuart.
This is a strong case, showing the extent to which the Court of
Chancery in England has carried the doctrine of applying the
income or ifiterest of a legacy, payable at a future period, given
to a minor for his maintenance and education, even before the
time arrives when the legacy is payable.
The weight of authority, undoubtedly, ,now is in favor 'of allowing the payment of annuities or incomes to commence at the testator's death. The Chancellor assumes this in Craig v." Craig,
3 Barb. Oh. 6, referring to Gibson v. Bott, 7 Yes. 96; Fe'arns v.
Young,-9 I'd. 558 ; .BeeecaOwing's Case, 1 Bland. Oh. Rep. 296.
The case -of Angerstei, v. Martin, Turner & *Russ. Rep. 282,
came before -Lord ELDON in 1823. The testator in that case devised his freehold estates to J. Angerstein for life, with remaindek
to his-children in strict settlements, and as to his residuary personal
estate he bequeathed the same to trustees, to be invested in the
purchase of lands, to be settled in the same mariner, with authority to invest the funds in stocks, &c., until the estates could be
purchased, the interest or income to go to the same person or perso-qs to -whom the rents of the estate would go if thd .purchase
had been made. The tenant for life filed his bill within thd year
after the testator's death, for the purpose of having the question
decided, whether he was entitled -to the annual interest of the
clear residue of the personal estate from the testator's death, or
whether the amount of such interest for the first year was to form
a part of the capital of the general residue, and which was to be
added to the sam e, and invested, and, upon a review of all the
previous cases, it was -decided that the interest from the death of
the testator belonged to the tenants for life, and was not to'be
added to the residue for the benefits of those who were bhtitled to
the estates in remainder in the property to be purchased. Aid
in the case of Hewitt v. Morris, which came before Lord ELDON
a few months afterwards (Turn. & Russ. Rep. 241), the testator

-
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directed his executors to invest the residue of his estate; after
payment of debts and legacies, in the funds or upon securities,
the interest to be paid to A. for life, and after his death the principal to be held upon trust for his children.
The tenant for life was held to be entitled to interest accruing
within the year next after the testator's death, upon funds in
which the testator's. property stood invested at the time of his
death, and which were not required for the payment of debts and
legacies.
And it is to be observed that, in each of these cases, the interest and income -were decreed to commence before the exact
amount of principal fund was ascertained. See also Bickford v.
Tobin, 1 Yes. 808 ; Hill v. Hill, 3 V. & B. 183.
Chancellor WALWQRTH1 in Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige
304, after a citation and review of the authorities, observes that
"the result of the English cases appears to be, and I have not been
able to find any in this country establishing a different principle,
that in the bequest of a life estate in a residuary fund, and where
no time is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment of the *use or income of such residue, the
legatee is entitled to the interest or income of the clear residue,
as afterwards ascertained,to be computed from the time of the
death of the .testator. All the cases which appear to conflict
with'this rule, except the two decided by Sir JoHN LEACH, whichare no longer to be copnsidered as authority, will be found to be
cases in which the testator had directed one species of property
to be converted into another, or the residue of any fund to.be
inveited in a particular manner, and had then given a life estate
in the funds as thus converted or invested. In such cases it
appears to be consistent- with the will of the testator to" consider
the life interest as commencing when the conversion takes place,
or the investment is made, either within the year or at the expiration of that time. But as a year is considered a reasonable time
for the executor to comply with the testator's directions as to the
conversion or investment, the legatee for life cannot be kept out
of the interest or income beyond that period. In the case under
consideration, there is no direction for the investment thereof in
any particular manner, before the right of the-widow to the use
thereof for life was to commence, and as it appeared that a great
portion of the personal estate was in bonds and mortgages and

1.18

COOK v. MEEKER.

other securities, which were drawing interest at the death of the
testator,.there is no good reason for depriving the widow.of the
use of the residuary esta6e for an entire year." These remarks
apply with peculiar force to the case now under consideration.
There there is no direction for a. conversi6n, but a direction iu
effedt to transfer the bonds and mortgages of the testators, to tfe
amount 'of the several bequests, ir satisfaction of them. These
securities were all bearing interest, and it is manifest that it was
the intent of the testator that 'these several beneficiaries should
have the interest and income of the amount set apart for them, for
their.maintenance and education. And the fact that the precise
amount of the .funds was not ascertiined until the expiration of a.
year from the death of the testator, furnishes no reason why the
interest thereon should not be paid to the beneficiary before that
time. In Be Wifllams, 12 Legal Observer 179, the surrogate
of Kings county allowed interest to an adopted daughter of. the
testator., on a sum of $5000 directed to be invested, and the interest to be paid to her during life on. the proportionate share of
her legacy frbm the death of the testator, but he 'rfused to all6w
interest from the same period to.the widow, of the -testator, upon a
legacy to be invested and the interest thereof paid to hore In
matter of !Fisk'8EJstate, 18 -Abbt. Pr.' Rep. 209, the surrogate
of New York in 1865, decided, that annuities,, or incomes'and
interest upon sums directed to be invested upon trust to jay
over interest or income, commence to run from-the death of the
testator.
The case of Hilard'sEstate, Z5W. & S. 80, is quite in pomit.
There the bequest was to the executors' in trust to put' at interest
a certain sum, and apply the interest and income thereof to the
sister of the testator. The court held-that she was entitled to the
interest upon the sum so held in trust during the first year from
the death of the testator. It ig a significant fact, that the statute
law of Pennsylvania, in relation to the. pz 5 mnent of legacies, con'
forms to that of this -tate, directing their payment at the expiration of 'a year from the death of the testator. See also, for' to
same doctrine, -Eyrev. aolding, 5 Binn. 472.
The authorities would seem abundant, therefore to sustain the
doctrine, that where a sum is left in trust, with.a direction that
the interest and income should be applied to the us6 of a person,
such person is entitled to the interest thereof from the date of the
-

